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A PARSIMONIOUS THEORY
OF EVIDENCE-BASED CHOICE
FATEMEH BORHANI AND EDWARD J. GREEN
Abstract. That an agent’s possible evidential states form a Boolean
algebra (on which it is natural to define a probability measure) is an as-
sertion that ideally should be proved, rather than assumed, in justifying
rational choice as a representation of expected utility. A more parsi-
monious, axiomatic characterization of evidence is provided here. Two
primitive entities are evidential states and a relation, more specific than,
between evidential states. The axioms specify that more-specific-than is
a partial order, there is a minimally specific e-state, and more-specific-
than is a separative order. Choice alternatives are another primitive
entity. A plan is an assignment of a choice alternative to each evidential
state. In general, plans satisfying a version of the sure-thing principle
cannot be rationalized by expected utility. But there is such a rational-
ization if the evidential structure is a tree.
1. Introduction
A main “selling point” of the Bayesian approach to statistics is that it
expands the focus of the subject from a rather narrow study of numerical
data to a broader and more conceptually satisfactory study of evidence in
general. Especially, in the decision-theoretic formulation of Savage [1972],
it is a study of the rational use of evidence to inform practical decisions.1
From that perspective, Savage’s modeling of evidence as a Boolean algebra
of events, each of which is a set of possible states of the world, is a liability.
There are intuitive examples (one of which will be presented below, in section
2) that cast doubt on the idea that the sets corresponding to evidential
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states would form a Boolean algebra. In view of such examples, the thesis
that evidential states are sets that form precisely the type of a structure
on which probability measures are defined is something that it would be
more satisfactory to prove, rather than to hypothesize, in demonstrating
that rational choice can be represented by expected-utility maximization.
This article addresses the following two questions: (a) How should ev-
idence be modeled for the purpose of normative theorizing about rational
choice? (b) Given how Bayesian statisticians, and Savage in particular, have
modeled evidence, do their conclusions genuinely characterize how the ra-
tional use of evidence should inform choices or decisions? The first question
does not presume Bayesian theory as a background or benchmark. The
second question is distinct from various questions about, and criticisms of,
Bayesian decision theory that have been raised antecedently.2
Question (a) will be addressed in section 2, where a parsimonious axiom-
atization of evidence is proposed. The axioms are stated in terms of two
primitive entities: a set of a person’s possible evidential states (or e-states,
for short) and a binary relation, weakly more specific than, between e-states.
An evidential structure comprises both of these entities. The axioms that
characterize an evidential structure are that more-specific-than is a partial
order; that there is a prior-evidence e-state, than which every other e-state
is stritly more specific; and that more-specific-than is a separative order.
This last condition means that, if some e-state, y, is not more specific than
another, x, then there is a third e-state, z, which is strictly more specific
than y and is also incompatible with x.3
Question (b) will be addressed in sections 3–5, where evidence-based
choice will be studied. An evidential structure and a set of choice alter-
natives (acts, in Savage’s terminology) will be primitive entities. A plan
will be defined to be an assignment of a choice alternative (to be interpreted
as being the recommended/chosen alternative) to each evidential state. A
plan thus represents an agent’s pattern of evidence-based choices. What it
2In studying whether or not one or another principle resembling Savage’s sure-thing
principle and formulable within the language of the theory to be presented here entails
a conditional-expected-utility representation of rational choice, the authors’ purpose is
not to privilege that representation. In fact, the various generalizations of expected-
utility theory that have been proposed as alternatives to Savage’s theory (surveyed, for
example, by Gilboa [2009]) all incorporate, with at most modest modifications, Savage’s
formalization of evidence. Parallel to the analysis provided here, one could study whether
the various postulates of those generalizations that play analogous roles to the sure-thing
principle can be re-stated in the present theory in ways that entail the representations
of rational choice derived respectively from them. A plausible conjecture is that the
conclusions would mirror those found here: that such representations can be derived
under special assumptions about the structure of evidence, but not from parsimonious
assumptions that express the intrinsic structure of evidence in general.
3For example, since having observed a flash is not more specific than having observed
a red flash, then there must be another e-state—having observed a blue flash—that is also
more specific than observing a flash but that is incompatible with having observed a red
flash.
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means for a plan to be justified by subjective conditional expected utility will
be defined. Three candidates for an axiom characterizing rational choice, of
increasing strength, and in the spirit of Savage’s sure-thing principle, will
be specified, with the middle-strength axiom being the most closely analo-
gous to a condition framed by Savage [1972, theorem 2.3, section 2.7] that
he regards to be a formal expression of the sure-thing principle.4 It will be
shown by counter-example (example 4) that not even the strongest of these
axioms, in the presence of the axioms defining an evidential structure, en-
tails a subjective-conditional-expected-utility rationalization of a plan.5 It
will also be proved (proposition 2 and proposition 3) that even the weakest
version of a sure-thing axiom is sufficient for a plan to have a subjective-
conditional-expected-utility representation if, besides the defining axioms of
an evidential structure being satisfied, the specificity relation makes the set
of e-states to be a directed tree (to be defined formally in (49)). It will be
clear that such evidential structures correspond to filtrations, which play a
prominent role in stochastic-process theory and in applied decision theory.
However, the same intuitive example that shows why it is restrictive to posit
that evidential states form a Boolean algebra, also shows that the evidential
states may not form a tree.
The concluding section 6 includes remarks on antecedent theories of sub-
jective conditional expected utility, the robustness of the article’s results to
considering finitely additive measures instead of countably additive ones, an
indication of how weak the parsimonious theory is, the relationship between
infinite evidential structures and Boolean algebras, and the status of the
definition of subjective conditional expected utility in the article as a model
of na¨ıve, rather than sophisticated, Bayesian rationality.
The authors are inclined to give a nuanced interpretation to the overall re-
sults of this article. If the fundamental intuition about rational choice under
uncertainty is that a rational agent conforms to some version of the sure-
thing principle, then subjective conditional expected utility falls short of
being a fully general necessary condition for rational evidence-based choice,
so it should certainly not be taken to be an intrinsic definition of rational
4The weakest of these axioms is reminiscent of conditions of dynamic consistency and
consequentialism that have been studied by Weller [1978], Hammond [1988], Ghirardato
[2002], and others. In various frameworks in which evidential states are taken to be sets
of possible worlds that form a Boolean algebra, those authors have proved results that
relate consistency to a subjective-conditional-expected-utility criterion. However, there
are considerable differences in both framework and proof strategy between those research
contributions and the present one. The results proved here do not seem to be derivable
as corollaries of antecedent results.
5By rationalization, it is meant only that some imputation of subjective probabili-
ties and state-contingent utilities of acts to the agent rationalizes the plan. This is a
weaker criterion than the criterion of representability that is common in the Bayesian-
decision-theory literature, which includes an assertion of uniqueness (up to positive affine
transformation of utilities). Antecedent theories of subjective conditional expected utility
are discussed in section 6.1.
4 F. BORHANI AND E. J. GREEN
choice. Nonetheless, its employment for practical decision making is sound
in a fairly general class of situations that can be explicitly, operationally
characterized.
2. Evidence
2.1. Definition and example of an evidential structure. The set of
an agent’s possible evidential states will be denoted by X. (The elements
of X will often be called e-states, for short.) There is a binary relation, σ,
among e-states, that satisfies assumptions (5)–(7) below. That xσ y (x is
weakly more specific than y) means that evidence x is consistent with, and
possibly more specific than, evidence y. Σ denotes the strict part of σ and
is defined, as usual, by
(1) xΣ y ⇐⇒ [xσ y and not y σ x]
E-state x is defined to be immediately more specific than z (xΣ1 z) by
the condition that
(2) xΣ1 z ⇐⇒ [xΣ z and not ∃y xΣ yΣ z]
Define
(3) Y (z) = {x | xΣ1 z}
Condition (7), below, involves the concept of two e-states being incompat-
ible with one another. Incompatibility means that there is no e-state that
is demonstrably consistent with both of them, where consistency is demon-
strated by being weakly more specific according to σ. Formally, that x and
y are incompatible (x ⊥ y) is defined by
(4) x ⊥ y ⇐⇒ not ∃z [z σ x and z σ y]
Here are the assumptions regarding e-states and the specificity ordering.
A structure, (X, σ), that satisfies conditions (5)–(7) will be called an eviden-
tial structure, or an e-structure.
(5) σ is a partial order (that is, reflexive, transitive, and antisymmet-
ric).6
(6) r, an element of X, satisfies ∀x [x 6= r =⇒ xΣ r], and X 6= {r}.
(That is, r is the root of (X, σ), regarded as an ordered structure.)
(7) If not xσ z, then there exists an e-state, y, such that y σ x and y ⊥ z.
6The assumption of antisymmetry could be dropped. Then the definition of immediate-
dominance consistency (cf. section 3.2) would have to be amended to require that, if x σ y
and y σ x, then the chosen alternative at x is the same as at y. Also, the proofs of several
results would need to take account of the possibility that xσ y and y σ x but x 6= y. While
there can be interpretations of the concept of evidence that are intuitively reasonable
in some applications, and such that the weakly-more-specific relation is reflexive and
transitive but not antisymmetric (such as the example of evidence for identification of
a chemical element provided in Borhani and Green [2016, section 2.1]), we eschew the
highest level of generality in order to keep the formal analysis as simple as possible.
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r = [0, 0]
x1 = [1, 0] x2 = [0, 1]
z1 = [2, 0] z3 = [1, 1] z2 = [0, 2]
Figure 1. Diagram of Example 1
A relation satisfying condition (7) is called separative. The condition
asserts that, unless e-state x is weakly more specific than e-state y, x can be
“fleshed out” in some way that would be incompatible with y, as has been
exemplified in footnote 3.
Although we are not aware of a prior attempt to give an abstract defini-
tion of an evidential structure using assumptions that are as parsimonious
as possible, there are two types of ordered structure that have been used
implicitly for that purpose: Boolean lattices and trees.7 Both of those types
of structure are separative.
An example of an e-structure that is neither a Boolean lattice nor a tree is
now provided, along with two possible interpretations of this structure. One
interpretation (regarding coin tossing) is intended to provide clear intuition
for the meaning of the formal example. The other interpretation (regarding
a scientific investigation) is intended to convey the breadth of the range
of situations in which an e-structure such as this one might arise. It is
not necessarily a typical e-structure, but it is one that an adequate theory
ought to cover. Thus, the example serves to motivate the study of a more
parsimonious theory of e-structures than the theories of Boolean lattices and
of trees would afford.
Figure 1 depicts example 1, a simple example of a finite e-structure. In the
figure, if one e-state is depicted below another and the two are connected by
a path of line segments, then the lower e-state is strictly more specific than
the higher one. This convention will be observed in diagrams throughout
this article, except where explicitly amended.
Example 1. Let X = {r, x1, x2, z1, z2, z3}. Let Σ1 comprise the pairs
(z1, x1), (z2, x2), (z3, x1), (z3, x2), (x1, r), and (x2, r), and let σ be the reflex-
ive, transitive closure of Σ1.
7A Boolean lattice is derived from a Boolean algebra by defining xσ y ⇐⇒ x∧ y = x.
Thus it provides an abstract version of the Boolean structure that Savage [1972] imposes
on evidence. A tree corresponds to an e-structure that satisfies the condition that, for
every x 6= r, there exists a unique y such that xΣ1 y and there are finitely many y such
that xσ y. (An equivalent definition is given in (49) below.) Raiffa [1970] used trees to
provide an elementary exposition of Bayesian decision theory.
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How might this e-structure be interpreted? Suppose that two coins are
tossed, and that the agent is told only a minimum number of tosses that
have landed on each side. That is, such censored reports of the coin-toss
outcomes, rather than the outcomes themselves, correspond to the agent’s
possible evidential states. Specifically, let the e-state associated with [m,n]
characterize the agent’s situation after having been told that “At least m of
the coins landed ‘heads’ and at least n landed ‘tails’.”
The e-structure in example 1 is neither a Boolean lattice nor a tree.8
Nonetheless, example 1 is not pathological. Consider the following analogue.
In a certain European valley that paleontologists have recently begun to ex-
plore, Homo heidelbergensis and Homo neanderthalensis co-existed 300,000
years ago. A paleontologist wants to know which of the two species was
more numerous at that place and time. The evidential state of the paleon-
tologist might be, for example, that, so far, 21 H. neanderthalensis skeletons
and 34 H. heidelbergensis skeletons have been discovered in the valley and
shown by radiocarbon dating to be 300,000 years old. That does not mean
that exactly 55 hominins lived in the valley at the time, of whom 21 were
H. neanderthalensis. Rather, it means that there were at least 21 members
of H. neanderthalensis and at least 34 members of H. heidelbergensis who
lived in the valley then. This is analogous to the evidential state that at
least one toss of a coin landed ‘heads’ and at least zero tosses landed ‘tails’.
The paleontologist’s evidential state is immediately more specific than each
of two distinct e-states: that 20 H. neanderthalensis skeletons and 34 H. hei-
delbergensis skeletons of relevant age have been discovered so far, and that
21 H. neanderthalensis skeletons and 33 H. heidelbergensis skeletons of rel-
evant age have been discovered so far. Thus the e-structure that comprises
the possible evidential states of the paleontologist is not a tree. Neither
is a Boolean lattice. It would be artificial, and arguably inappropriate, to
suppose, for example, that the disjunction of the paleontologist’s e-states is
necessarily an e-state.9
2.2. Embedding a finite e-structure in a Boolean field of sets. As
often happens, it is true here that studying the finite examples of a class of
structures can be helpful. All of the examples to be presented in sections 4.3
and 4.4, which exhibit disanalogies between a plausible criterion of evidence-
based choice and Savage’s [1972] Bayesian criterion (that is, the “sure-thing
principle”), are finite. Proposition 3 (section 5.2), which characterizes a case
in which a close analogy does hold, is more easily proved (as Proposition 2 in
section 4.5) in the finite case. Although a finite e-structure is not a Boolean
8(X, σ) is not a tree because there is not a unique y such that z3Σ1 y. (X, σ) cannot
be a Boolean lattice because, in order for it to be such, there would have to be an e-state
that is z1 ∧ z2, that e-state would thus be more specific than both z1 and z2, and there is
no such e-state in (X, σ).
9In particular, the principle of total evidence in Bayesian decision theory requires that,
having made one observation or another, an agent should condition on that observation
alone rather than on its disjunction with an alternate observation. Cf. Good [1967].
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lattice in general, proposition 1 (to be stated and proved below) will asssert
that every finite e-structure (X, σ), corresponds in a canonical way to a finite
Boolean algebra. Specifically, each e-state, x ∈ X, is associated with the set
of leaves of σ that are weakly more specific than x. A leaf is a maximally
specific e-state. That is,
(8) x is a leaf of (X, σ) iff not ∃y yΣx.
(9) Λ = {z | z is a leaf of (X, σ)}
(10) l(x) = {z | z ∈ Λ and z σ x}
This correspondence will be utilized in the proof of proposition 1, which
proceeds via the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let (X, σ) be a finite e-structure. For each x ∈ X, there is a
leaf, z, such that z σ x.
Proof. Otherwise a contradiction would result, as follows. The e-state x
itself cannot be a leaf, or else reflexiveness of σ (condition 5) would entail
that x itself is a leaf such that is weakly more specific than x. So, there must
be an e-state, y0, such that y0Σx. If y0 were a leaf, then y0 ∈ l(x), so there
must be an e-state, y1, such that y1Σ y0. By transitivity of Σ (condition
5), y1 σ x, so y1 cannot be a leaf or else y1 ∈ l(x). Continuing in this way,
an infinite sequence y0, y1, . . . , yn, . . . is constructed such that, for each n,
yn+1Σ yn. By transitivity and asymmetry of Σ, all of the elements of this
sequence are distinct from one another. But this conclusion contradicts the
finiteness of X, so it must be that l(x) 6= ∅. 
Proposition 1. Let (X, σ) be a finite e-structure. The mapping, l, defined
by (10), satisfies
(11) l(r) = Λ
and, for all x and y,
(12) l(x) 6= ∅
(13) x is not a leaf =⇒ l(x) =
⋃
zΣ x
l(z)
(14) xσ y ⇐⇒ l(x) ⊆ l(y)
(15) x ⊥ y ⇐⇒ l(x) ∩ l(y) = ∅
Proof. Condition (6), that every e-state is weakly more specific than the
root, implies condition (11). Lemma 1 shows that condition (12) holds,
when (10) defines l.
To prove (13), suppose that x is not a leaf. If y ∈ l(x), then yΣx and
y ∈ l(y), so y ∈
⋃
zΣx l(z). Conversely, if y ∈
⋃
zΣx l(z), then for some
zΣx, y ∈ l(z) and therefore y σ z σ x, so y ∈ l(x).
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To prove condition (14), first note that xσ y =⇒ l(x) ⊆ l(y) follows from
(13). To prove the converse implication, suppose that not xσ y. Then, by
separativeness of σ (condition (7)), there exists an e-state, w, such that w σ x
and w ⊥ y. Lemma 1 shows that, for some leaf, z, z σ w. By transitivity of
σ, it follows that z σ x and z ⊥ y. Therefore z ∈ l(x) \ l(y), so l(x) 6⊆ l(y).
Condition (15) is proved analogously to (14), by proving the contraposi-
tive of the implication in each direction. 
The conceptual significance of proposition 1 is that the leaves of σ can
be treated formally as being states of the world, and the power set of those
leaves can be treated as a Boolean field of events, among which some (the
images under l of e-states) correspond to evidential states.10 The one-to-one
mapping from e-states to the events that are their images will be used to
define expected utility in the framework of evidential structures and plans.
3. Evidence-based choice
3.1. Choice alternatives, plans, and conditional preferences. Plans,
to be introduced in this section, are the entities, regarding which conditions
will be sought that ensure rationalizability in terms of subjective conditional
expected utility. A plan specifies which alternative is chosen in each eviden-
tial state in some evidential structure. As has already been discussed in
the introduction, the set of choice alternatives is a primitive entity in the
specification of the theory. Formally, A is the set of choice alternatives.
Throughout the article, it is assumed for mathematical simplicity that
(16) A is finite, and contains at least two distinct alternatives.
A function, ζ : X → A, is a plan. If X is finite, then ζ will be called a
finite plan. If X is a tree, then ζ will be called a tree plan.
A conditional-preference relation is a ternary relation, R ⊆ A × A × X,
such that
(17) x is a weak order (that is, a total preorder) on A, where a x
b ⇐⇒ (a, b, x) ∈ R.11 (≺x is the asymmetric part, and ∼ is the
symmetric part, of x.)
Conditional-preference relation R rationalizes plan ζ iff
(18) ∀x ∀a \ q{ζ(x)} a ≺x ζ(x)
10‘Field’ will be used in this article to refer either to a Boolean field or a σ field. In
either case, a field is a subset of the power set of some specified set. It must contain
the entire space and the null set, and must be closed under complementation and under
finite (in the case of a Boolean field) or countable (in the case of a σ field) unions and
intersections of its elements. The term will be used without qualification when a statement
applies to both Boolean fields and σ fields, and also when the type of field intended is
clear from context.
11In all subsequent discussions, where reference is made to R and x, this relation
between them is assumed. The variables, ‘a’ and ‘b’, will range over A.
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Plan ζ is rationalizable if some conditional-preference relation rationalizes
it.12
3.2. Immediate-dominance consistency of preferences and plans.
Now we introduce a putative criterion of rationality that will be a main
focus of analysis in the remainder of this paper. This principle is the most
natural cognate in the theory of evidence-based choice to the “sure thing
principle” in Savage’s theory. Before stating the principle, let’s recall Sav-
age’s principle, beginning with the informal example by which he motivates
it.
A businessman . . . considers the outcome of the next presi-
dential election relevant to the attractiveness of a purchase.
. . . [H]e asks whether he would buy if he knew that the Re-
publican candidate would win, and decides that he would do
so. Similarly, he considers whether he would buy if he knew
that the Democratic candidate would win, and again decides
that he would do so. Seeing that he would buy in either
event, he decides that he should buy, even though he does
not know which event . . . will obtain[.]13
Keep in mind that events play the role in Savage’s theory that e-states
play here and that, in fact, the non-null events of a Boolean field, together
with the subset relation, satisfy the definition of an e-structure. Savage for-
mulates his condition P3 as a formal postulate corresponding to the sure
thing principle, he derives its equivalence (in the presence of other postu-
lates) with essentially the following assertion.14 Let B be a Boolean field of
sets.
(19) If Y ⊆ B is a partition of z ∈ B, and if a ≺x b for all x in
Y , then a ≺z b.
A situation in which Y is the set of e-states that are immediately more
specific than z (that is, Y = Y (z) according to definition (3)), rather than
a situation in which Y is a partition of z, will be considered here. A
conditional-preference relation is immediate-dominance (ID) consistent iff,
for every z ∈ X,
(20) [Y (z) 6= ∅ and ∀x∈Y (z) a ≺x b] =⇒ a ≺z b
This condition is in a similar spirit to Savage’s proposition (19). It expresses
the idea that if, in e-state x, an agent would strictly prefer b to a after
acquiring just one piece of further evidence beyond what is comprised in
12This terminology was introduced by Richter [1966], in his abstract formulation of the
economic theory of revealed preference. Moreover, the entire framework introduced so far
in this article is tantamount to his framework, with an e-state being a budget and a plan
being a choice in his terminology.
13Savage [1972, chapter 2.7].
14Savage [1972, chapter 2.7, theorem 2]. Technically, Savage’s theorem is slightly
stronger than the paraphrase of it here.
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x, regardless of what that new evidence would show, then the agent should
already strictly prefer b to a in x.
Call plan ζ immediate-dominance (ID) consistent if, for every a and z,15
(21) [Y (z) 6= ∅ and ∀x∈Y (z) [ζ(x) = a]] =⇒ ζ(z) = a
Lemma 2. A plan is ID consistent if, and only if, it is rationalized by an
ID-consistent conditional-preference relation.
Proof. Clearly, if any ID-consistent conditional-preference relation ratio-
nalizes plan ζ, then ζ is ID consistent. To prove the converse, define a
conditional-preference relation, R, by a ≺x b ⇐⇒ [a 6= ζ(x) = b]. (Other-
wise, since x is a weak order, both a x b and b x a.) R rationalizes ζ,
and ζ is ID consistent if, and only if, R is ID consistent. 
4. Representability by subjective conditional expected utility
4.1. Reformulating conditional probability. The first step in exam-
ining the relationship between evidence-based choice and maximization of
conditional expected utility is to reformulate the standard Bayesian account
of conditioning beliefs on evidence in terms of an evidential structure as
defined here. Recall the standard formulation. There is a sample space,
(Ω,B, pi), where B is a field of subsets of Ω and pi : B → [0, 1] is a probability
measure. (The field and measure may be either finitely or countably ad-
ditive.) Evidence is modeled as a sequence, 〈Xn〉n∈N, of random variables,
that is, of functions Xn : Ω → R.
16 These functions are measurable, that is,
for any r < s, {ω | r < Xn(ω) < s} ∈ B.
Performing potentially infinitely many tosses of a coin is an example. A
sample point (that is, an element of Ω), is a function ω : N→ {0, 1}, where
ω(n) = 0 indicates that the nth toss lands ‘tails’ and ω(n) = 1 indicates that
the nth toss lands ‘heads’ in possible world ω. B is the Boolean field of finite
intersections of the sets (or events), {ω | ωn = k} for n ∈ N and k ∈ {0, 1}
(or the σ field of countable unions and intersections of those events). The
random variable Xn, defined by Xn(ω) = ω(n), specifies how the n
th toss
lands in each possible world. The epistemic states are finite sequences of
observations of toss outcomes. Again encoding ‘tails’ by 0 and ‘heads’ by 1,
this corresponds to
(22) X =
⋃
n∈N
{0, 1}n
where {0, 1}0 = {∅}. In possible world ω, after the coin has been tossed n
times, the observer is in e-state (ω(0), . . . , ω(n−1)). Let x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) =
15This definition corresponds to the definition of consistency in Green and Park [1995],
when ζ (which could be a multi-valued correspondence in that article) is a function.
16A different index set—for example, a finite set—may be appropriate to use in some
specific application.
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(ω(0), . . . , ω(n − 1)). The event in B that is associate with set of possible
worlds in which the observer can be in this e-state is
(23) e(x) =
⋂
k<n
X−1k (xk) ∈ B
It is obvious that e satisfies analogues of conditions (11)–(15) of proposi-
tion 1. In general, where (X, σ) is an e-structure and B is a field of subsets of
set Ω, call e : X→ B an embedding if it satisfies those analogous conditions.17
That is,
(24) e(r) = Ω
and, for all x and y,
(25) e(x) 6= ∅
(26) [∃z zΣx] =⇒ e(x) =
⋃
zΣ x
e(z)
(27) xσ y ⇐⇒ e(x) ⊆ e(y)
(28) x ⊥ y ⇐⇒ e(x) ∩ e(y) = ∅
Returning to the coin-tossing example, suppose that Ω and B are as above,
and that pi is a probability measure. Then, for an event B ∈ B, the prob-
ability of B conditional on having observed the first n tosses of the coin
is
(29) pi[B|X0, . . . ,Xn−1](ω) =
pi(B ∩
⋂
k<nX
−1
k (xk))
pi(
⋂
k<nX
−1
k (xk))
Expressing this in the language of an e-structure and an embedding, it
becomes
(30) pi[B|x] =
pi(B ∩ e(x))
pi(e(x))
4.2. Representation of conditional preferences by subjective con-
ditional expected utility. Let R be a conditional-preference relation, for
A and X. Then R is subjective-conditional-expected-utility (SCEU ) repre-
sentable if there are an embedding, e, of (X, σ) into a measurable space,
(Ω,B), and a countably additive probability measure, pi : B → [0, 1] and
17The only condition that differs from its analogue for l, beyond a notational change,
is (26). This divergence is necessary because, for instance, there are no leaves in the e-
structure that formalizes the the coin-tossing example discussed here. It will be proved
in section 5.1 that, if an infinite e-structure is a tree, then it can be embedded in a field
of sets analogously to what has been done in proposition 1. A still more general result is
proved in Borhani and Green [2016].
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bounded measurable functions, ua : Ω → R, for a ∈ A, such that, for each
a, b, and x,18
(31) a x b ⇐⇒
∫
e(x)
ua dpi ≤
∫
e(x)
ub dpi
By (31), if e, pi and 〈ua〉a∈A represent R, then
(32) [∃a ∃b a ≺x b] =⇒ pi(e(x)) > 0
Note that, in view of (30), and with conditional expectation being defined
from conditional probability by Lebesgue integration,
(33)
∫
B
f dpi = pi(B)E[f |B]
From (32) and (33), it is clear that ua(ω) should be understood to be the
state-contingent utility of alternative a at sample point ω.
Regarding why boundedness of ua is required in the definition of SCEU
representability, three comments are in order.
• SCEU representability is used to define SCEU rationality of a plan.
Proposition 3 will characterize SCEU rational plans on e-structures
that may be infinite, and so from which not all real-valued functions
are bounded. That result is proved by a construction of bounded
functions. Including boundedness in this definition indirectly incor-
porates the recognition of that fact in the statement of the theorem.
• Boundedness of the utility function in Savage’s representation is im-
plied by Savage’s axioms.19 Thus, incorporating boundedness in
this definition would facilitate comparisons between possible results
about SCEU representability and their analogues in Savage’s frame-
work.
• While some persons view decision theory as being a purely descrip-
tive enterprise of accounting for agents’ behavior, others view it as
having a role in guiding the formulation and assessment of theories
of cognition. On this latter view, the Bayesian theory is a model
of agents whose preferences among alternativess are derived from
the interaction of two, distinct, mental entities: beliefs and state-
contingent utilities. Beliefs are represented by a probability mea-
sure. State-contingent utilities are completely distinct from beliefs,
so they should induce a preference among acts in combination with
any possible probability measure, not only in combination with the
probability measure that the agent happens to hold. That is, state-
contingent utilities should be integrable with any probability mea-
sure, and therefore (in order to avoid a version of the St. Petersburg
18All of the probability measures occurring in examples or in proofs of results in this
article will be purely atomic, so
∫
e(x)
g dpi can be interpreted as
∑
x∈C
g(x)pi({x}). As
will be discussed in detail in section 6.2, these results would continue to hold if countable
additivity were replaced y finite additivity in the definition of SCEU.
19Fishburn [1970, theorem 14.5]
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r 7→ a
x1 7→ b x2 7→ b
z1 7→ a z3 7→ b z2 7→ a
Figure 2. Diagram of Example 2
paradox), the state-contingent utility of any alternative should be a
bounded function.
4.3. ID consistency is neither necessary nor sufficient for SCEU
rationality. Conditional-preference relation R rationalizes plan ζ iff, for
all x, ∀a \ {ζ(x)} a ≺x ζ(x).
Plan ζ is SCEU rational if it is rationalized by a SCEU-representable
conditional-preference relation for (X, σ) and A.20 Equivalently, ζ is SCEU-
rational iff there exist an embedding, e, of (X, σ) into a measurable space,
(Ω,B), a probability measure, pi : B → [0, 1], and, for each a ∈ A, a bounded,
measurable function, ua : Ω → R, such that, for all x,
(34) ∀a \ {ζ(x)}
∫
e(x)
ua dpi <
∫
e(x)
uζ(x) dpi
That is, if (34) is satisfied, then a ≺x b ⇐⇒
∫
e(x) ua dpi <
∫
e(x) ub dpi defines
an SCEU-representable conditional-preference relation that rationalizes ζ.
Note that, by (16) and (31) and (34),
(35) if e, pi and 〈ua〉a∈A SCEU rationalize ζ,
then ∀x pi(e(x)) > 0
A more subtle question is: what is the relation between a plan being
SCEU rational and being ID consistent? It will now be shown that, for
plans in general, being ID consistent is neither necessary nor sufficient for
being SCEU rational. It will subsequently be shown that the two conditions
are equivalent for tree plans.
Figures 2–4 represent plans. A label, ‘x 7→ a’, denotes that node x, at
that location, is mapped to alternative a by the plan. In examples 2 and 3,
the entire e-structure is the domain of the plan.
Example 2. ID consistency is not necessary for SCEU rationality. Let
X = {r, x1, x2, z1, z2, z3}. Let Σ1 comprise the pairs (xi, r), (zi, xi), and
(z3, xi) (for i ∈ {1, 2}), and let σ be the reflexive, transitive closure of
Σ1. Let A = {a, b}. Define plan ζ by ζ(r) = ζ(z1) = ζ(z2) = a and
ζ(x1) = ζ(x2) = ζ(z3) = b. This example is shown in figure 2.
20This definition corresponds closely to the definition of a Bayes contingent plan in
Green and Park [1995], except that here a plan is required to be a function rather than a
possibly multi-valued correspondence.
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r 7→ a
x1 7→ b x2 7→ c
z1 7→ c z3 7→ a z2 7→ b
Figure 3. Diagram of Example 3
Claim 1. Plan ζ of example 2 is SCEU rational but is not ID consistent.
Proof. Plan ζ is ID-inconsistent at r.
By proposition 1, l embeds (X, σ) into (Λ, 2Λ), where Λ = {z1, z2, z3}.
Events are assigned by l to e-states as follows: l(zi) = {zi}, l(xi) = {zi, z3},
and l(r) = {z1, z2, z3}.
The following probability measure and utility functions constitute an
SCEU representation of a conditional-preference relation that rationalizes
ζ: pi(z1) = pi(z2) = 2/7, pi(z3) = 3/7, u(a, z1) = u(a, z2) = u(b, z3) = 1,
u(b, z1) = u(b, z2) = u(a, z3) = 0. 
Corollary 1. There exists a conditional-preference relation that is SCEU
representable, but that rationalizes an ID-inconsistent conditional-preference
relation.
Proof. By claim 1, there exists a SCEU-representable conditional-preference
relation that rationalizes plan ζ in example 2. In particular, since the rela-
tion rationalizes ζ, it satisfies a x1 b and a x2 b but b r a. Thus it is not
ID consistent. 
Example 3. ID consistency is not sufficient for SCEU rationality. Let
X = {r, x1, x2, z1, z2, z3}. Let Σ1 comprise the pairs (z1, x1), (z2, x2), (z3, x1),
(z3, x2), (x1, r), and (x2, r), and let σ be the reflexive, transitive closure of
Σ1. Let A = {a, b, c}. Define plan ζ by ζ(r) = ζ(z3) = a, ζ(x1) = ζ(z2) = b,
and ζ(x2) = ζ(z1) = c. This example is shown in figure 3.
Claim 2. Plan ζ of example 3 is ID consistent but is not SCEU rational.
Proof. Plan ζ is ID consistent because there is no e-state, x, for which
ζ(Y (x)) is a singleton.
Suppose that ζ were rationalized by a conditional-preference relation rep-
resented by probability space, (Ω,B, pi), an embedding, e : X → B, and
utility functions 〈ua〉a∈A.
By condition (15), e(z1) ∩ e(z2) = e(z1) ∩ e(z3) = e(z2) ∩ e(z3) = ∅. By
condition (14), e(xi) = e(zi)∪ e(z3) and e(r) = e(x1)∪ e(x2). It follows that
(36) Ω = e(r) = e(x1) ∪ e(z2) = e(x2) ∪ e(z1)
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and
(37) e(x1) ∩ e(z2) = e(x2) ∩ e(z1) = ∅
Then, since ζ(x1) = ζ(z2) = b and ζ(x2) = ζ(z1) = c, (34) implies that∫
e(x1)
ub dpi >
∫
e(x1)
uc dpi and
∫
e(z2)
ub dpi >
∫
e(z2)
uc dpi and
∫
e(x2)
uc dpi >∫
e(x2)
ub dpi and
∫
e(z1)
uc dpi >
∫
e(z1)
ub dpi. These inequalities, together with
(36) and (37), imply a contradiction: that both
∫
Ω ub dpi >
∫
Ω uc dpi and∫
Ω uc dpi >
∫
Ω ub dpi. 
Corollary 2. There is a conditional-preference relation that is ID consistent
but not SCEU representable.
Proof. Let R be the ID-consistent conditional-preference relation, guaran-
teed to exist by lemma 2, that rationalizes plan ζ in example 3. By claim
2, R is not SCEU representable (or else ζ would be SCEU rational). 
4.4. A necessary condition for a finite plan to be SCEU rational.
In each of the proofs of claim 1 and claim 2, proposition 1 has been invoked
to translate an implication of ID consistency into the Borel-field framework
of Savage’s sure-thing principle. Those translations have revealed that ID
consistency is the stronger principle in one respect, but the weaker one in
another. In example 2, an implication of ID consistency translates into a
condition that would be an instance of Savage’s condition (19), except that
Y is only a cover of x, not a partition. In that respect, ID consistency
demands more than the sure-thing principle does. But, in example 3, there
is a partition to which Savage’s condition (19) applies, but the partition does
not correspond to a set Y (x), so ID consistency has no implication regarding
it. In that respect, ID consistency demands less than the sure-thing principle
does.
ID consistency is arguably the closest analogue of the sure-thing principle
that can be formulated, without invoking a non-trivial set-theoretic con-
struction, for e-structures in general. However, in the case of finite plans,
a closer analogue of Savage’s condition (19) exists.21 Its statement involves
the definition of a partition of an element of a finite e-structure.
Define P ⊆ X to be a partition of x iff the following three conditions are
satisfied.
(38) If z ∈ P , then z σ x
(39) For every leaf, z, of (X, σ) such that z σ x, there is some y ∈ P such
that z σ y
(40) If y ∈ P and z ∈ P and y 6= z, then y ⊥ z
Define a finite plan, ζ, to be partition-dominance (PD) consistent iff, for
every partition, P , of any e-state, x,
(41) [∀y∈P ζ(y) = a] =⇒ ζ(x) = a
21A generalization to infinite plans could be stated in terms of the embedding defined
by equation (80) below.
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z1 7→ a1
x4 7→ a4
z2 7→ a2
x1 7→ a1
z3 7→ a3
x2 7→ a2
z4 7→ a4
x3 7→ a3 r7→
a
∈
A
zs(1) 7→ as(1)
x1 7→ a1
zt(1) 7→ at(1)
Figure 4. Diagram of Example 4
Let l : X→ 2Λ be the embedding defined by (10) in proposition 1. Define
a finite plan, ζ, to be bilateral-dominance (BD) consistent consistent iff, for
every pair of sets P ⊆ X and Q ⊆ X,
(42)
[[P and Q satisfy (40)] and [
⋃
x∈P l(x) =
⋃
x∈Q l(x)]
and [∀x∈P ∀y∈P ζ(x) = ζ(y)] and [∀x∈Q ∀y∈Q ζ(x) = ζ(y)]]
=⇒ [∀x∈P ∀y∈Q ζ(x) = ζ(y)]
It follows immediately from proposition 1 that the image under l of a
partition as defined here is a partition of an event, and that condition (41)
transforms under l into an instance of Savage’s principle (19) (translating
ζ(x) = b as a ≺x b). Nonetheless, not even stronger requirement of BD con-
sistency is sufficient for SCEU rationality, as the following example shows.22
Example 4. BD consistency is not sufficient for SCEU rationality. Let
X = {r, x1, x2, x3, x4, z1, z2, z3, z4}. and A = {a1, a2, a3, a4}. Define w σ y iff
w = y or w = r or, for j ≡ i + 1 (mod 4) or j ≡ i + 2 (mod 4), w = xi
and y = zj . Let ζ(xi) = aζ(zi) = ai and ζ(r) ∈ A (ζ(r) is irrelevant to the
analysis of the example). This example is shown in the left part of figure 4.
Note that xσ y has the geometric interpretation that y is on a path between
r and x.
Claim 3. Plan ζ of example 4 is BD consistent but is not SCEU rational.
22Condition (41) follows from condition (42) by setting Q = {x}. To see that (41)
does not imply (42), add a leaf, z4Σ1 r, to the e-structure in example 3 and specify that
ζ(z4) = a. No e-state of this augmented e-structure has a partition that satisfies the
antecedent of (41) with respect to ζ (except, trivially, the singleton of the e-state itself),
so ζ is PD consistent. However, the partitions P = {x1, z2} and Q = {x2, z1} together
satisfy the antecedent of (42) with respect to ζ, but the consequent is not satisfied, so ζ
is not BD consistent.
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Proof. Call P ⊆ 2X pairwise incompatible if it satisfies condition (40). If P
is pairwise incompatible, then call
⋃
x∈P l(x) the support of P . Call P mono-
chrome iff ∀x∈P ∀y∈P ζ(x) = ζ(y). In this terminology, the antecedent of
(42) states that P and Q are monochrome, pairwise-incompatible sets that
share the same support.
Define s(i) ≡ i+1 (mod 4) and t(i) ≡ i+2 (mod 4). The significance of
this notation is illustrated, for i = 1, in the right part of figure 4.
First, it will be shown that the plan, ζ, in example 3 is BD consistent.
Note that the only monochrome, pairwise-incompatible subsets of 2X are
{r} and, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, {xi}, {zi}, and {xi, zi}. If P and Q share the same
support, then the cardinality of that support is k, where 1 ≤ k ≤ 4. If k = 1,
then there are i and j such that P = {zi} and Q = {zj}. The two pairwise-
incompatible sets share the same support only if zi = l(zi) = l(j) = j,
so P = Q. If k = 2, then there must be i and j such that P = {xi}
and Q = {xj}. For any h, the support of {xh} is {zs(h), zt(h)}, and an
argument parallel to the one just given shows that P = Q if the two pairwise-
incompatible sets have identical support. If k = 3, then there are i and j
such that P = {xi, zi} and Q = {xj , zj}. For any h, the support of {xh, zh}
is {zh, zs(h), zt(h)}, and again it is seen that P = Q if the two pairwise-
incompatible sets have identical support. If k = 4, then P = Q = {r}. In
conclusion, P and Q satisfy the antecedent of condition (42) only if P = Q.
In this trivial case, the conclusion of (42) is also satisfied, so the condition
is satisfied. That is, ζ is BD consistent.
Now it will be seen that ζ is not SCEU rational. A contradiction will
be derived from the assumption that probability measure pi on (Ω,B) and
{ua : Ω → R}a∈A SCEU rationalize ζ. Since the contradiction arises for all
possible choices of pi and {ua}a∈A, ζ is not SCEU rational.
Note that, as it applies to xi, condition (34) consists of three equations,
one of which specifies that as(i) ≺xi ai = ζ(xi). That equation is
(43)
∫
e(xi)
uasi dpi <
∫
e(xi)
uai dpi
Defining qjk =
∫
e(zk)
uaj dpi and invoking conditions (13) and (15) in the
definition of an embedding, (43) can be rewritten as
(44) qs(i)s(i) + qs(i)t(i) < qis(i) + qit(i)
Summing (44) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} yields
(45)
4∑
i=1
qs(i)s(i) +
4∑
i=1
qs(i)t(i) <
4∑
i=1
qis(i) +
4∑
i=1
qit(i)
Noting that t(i) = s(s(i)) and i = t(t(i)), this can be rewritten as
(46)
4∑
i=1
qii +
4∑
i=1
qis(i) <
4∑
i=1
qis(i) +
4∑
i=1
qt(i)i
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Subtracting
∑4
i=1 qis(i) from both sides yields
(47)
4∑
i=1
qii <
4∑
i=1
qt(i)i
However, for each i, since ζ(zi) = ai, qt(i)i < qii. Summing this inequality
over i yields
(48)
4∑
i=1
qt(i)i <
4∑
i=1
qii
which contradicts (47). 
4.5. ID consistency is equivalent to SCEU rationality for finite tree
plans. An e-structure, (X, σ), is a tree if the following condition is satisfied
for every e-state, x.23
(49) {y | xσ y} is finite, and ∀y ∀z [[xσ y and xσ z] =⇒ [y σ z or z σ y]]
A path of length n from x to y is specified by a sequence 〈z0, . . . , zn〉, that
satisfies the following condition.
z0 = x and zn = y
∀k<n zk Σ1 zk+1 if xΣ y
∀k<n zk+1Σ1 zk if yΣx
(50)
If y is the root, then n is defined to be is the depth of x.24
The following lemma summarizes standard facts regarding a tree. It fol-
lows immediately from Gallier [2011, theorem 3.2(6) and theorem 3.3(3)].
Lemma 3. Suppose that (X, σ) is a tree. For all x and y, xΣ y if, and only
if, there is a path from x to y satisfying ∀k<n zk Σ1 zk+1. There is a path
from x to y if, and only if, there is a path from y to x. If there is a path
from x to y, then it is unique. If xΣ y, then the depth of x is strictly greater
than the depth of y.
The following proposition is the main result of this section.
Proposition 2. A finite tree plan is SCEU-rational if, and only if, it is ID
consistent.
The proof proceeds via several lemmas. Lemma 4 shows that, if an e-
structure is a tree, then an embedding associates Y (x) with a partition of the
image of x under the embedding. Lemma 5 concerns induction and recursion
on well founded relations. Those principles are used to prove lemma 6,
23This definition and the following implication are easily shown to be equivalent to
common definitions of an arborescence (that is, a directed tree), such as Gallier [2011,
definition 3.20], except that, unlike some of those definitions, the present definition does
not require X to be finite.
24It follows from the uniqueness assertion in lemma 3 that there is a unique number
satisfying the definition of the depth of an e-state.
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showing that for any SCEU-rational plan, ζ, e-state, x, and alternative,
a 6= ζ(x), it is possible to “drill down” to a leaf that is weakly more specific
than x, constructing the path from x to the leaf in such a way that ζ never
specifies a. Lemmas 7 and 8 establish further, technical details that will be
used in the main proof.
Lemma 4. If an e-structure, (X, σ), is a tree; and if e embeds (X, σ) into
a Boolean field of sets, (Ω,B); and if ∃z zΣx; then {e(y) | y ∈ Y (x)} is a
partition of e(x).
Proof. It must be shown that {e(y) | y ∈ Y (x)} is a union of nonempty,
pairwise disjoint sets, the union over which is e(x). By the definition of an
embedding, for every y, e(y) 6= ∅. If w 6= y and {w, y} ⊆ Y (x), then not wσ y
and not y σ w, by the antisymmetry of σ and the definition of Σ1. Then, by
the definition of a tree, there is no z such that w σ z and y σ z. That is, w ⊥ y.
Therefore, by the definition of an embedding, e(w) ∩ e(y) = ∅. It remains
only to show that e(x) =
⋃
y∈Y (x) e(y). By the definition of an embedding,
e(x) =
⋃
zΣ x e(z). Suppose that zΣx. Then, either z ∈ Y (x) or else, for
some y, zΣ yΣx. Since (X, σ) is tree, {y | zΣ yΣx} is finite, so there is
actually some y such that zΣ yΣ1 x. By the definition of an embedding,
e(z) ⊆ e(y). Thus, e(x) =
⋃
zΣ x e(y) implies that e(x) =
⋃
y∈Y (x) e(y). 
In the following lemma, proved in Gallier [2011, theorem 5.8], the nota-
tion, ‘f ↾ C’, denotes the restriction of function f to subset C of its domain.
Lemma 5. Let ≺ be a well founded relation on a set, X. If W ⊆ X is
such that ∀x [[∀w ≺ x w ∈ W ] =⇒ x ∈ W ], then W = X. If, where
Z is an arbitrary, non-empty set, F = {f | f : W → Z and W ⊆ X} and
g : F × X → X, then there is a unique function, f : X → Z, such that
∀x f(x) = g(f ↾ {z | z ≺ x}, x).
Lemma 6. Suppose that (X, σ) is a finite e-structure that is a tree, and that
ζ : X→ A is ID consistent. Since X is finite, it may be assumed without loss
of generality that X = {0, 1, . . . , n} for some number, n. Define the set of
“bad choices” by
(51) Bζ = {(x, a) | a 6= ζ(x)}
There is a unique function, βζ : Bζ → Λ, that satisfies the following defini-
tion.25
(52) βζ(x, a) =
{
x if x ∈ Λ
min{βζ(y, a) | (y, a) ∈ (Y (x)× {a}) ∩Bζ}, if x /∈ Λ
Function βζ is surjective and, for all (x, a) in Bζ , satisfies the condition that
(53) βζ(x, a)σ x and ∀y [[βζ(x, a)σ y σ x] =⇒ ζ(y) 6= a]
25Recall definition (9), that Λ is the set of leaves of σ.
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Proof. Suppose that x /∈ Λ and (x, a) ∈ Bζ . First, note that (Y (x) ×
{a}) ∩ Bζ 6= ∅. Otherwise, ID consistency would require that ζ(x) = a,
contradicting (x, a) ∈ Bζ . Thus the minimum in the clause of (52) that
defines βζ(x, a) is a well defined natural number. It needs to be shown that
this number is an element of Λ. This follows by well founded induction
on σ, which is well founded because X is finite. To apply lemma 5, take
W = {y | ∀a [(y, a) ∈ Bζ =⇒ βζ(y, a) ∈ Λ]}.
βζ is surjective because, for every leaf, x, there is an alternative, a, such
that ζ(x) 6= a; and βζ(x, a) = x.
Assertion (53) also holds by well founded induction on σ. This will
be proved separately for the two conjuncts of the assertion. To see that
∀x ∀a [(x, a) ∈ Bζ =⇒ βζ(x, a)σ x], take X = X in lemma 5, and define
W = {w | ∀a [[(w, a) ∈ Bζ =⇒ βζ(w, a)σ w] and
∀y [[βζ(w, a)σ y σ w] =⇒ ζ(y) 6= a]]}
(54)
Lemma 5 asserts that if, for all x, x ∈W is implied by ∀yΣx y ∈W . In fact,
it will be proved here that, for all x, x ∈ W is implied by ∀ yΣ1 x y ∈ W ,
so (53) will follow from lemma 5. Consider first the induction hypothe-
sis that, for all w ∈ Y (X) and for all a, (w, a) ∈ Bζ =⇒ βζ(w, a)σ w,
and suppose that (x, b) ∈ Bζ . If x is a leaf and (x, b) ∈ Bζ , then condi-
tion (52) specifies that βζ(x, b) = xσ x. Since b is arbitrary, this shows
that ∀a [[(x, a) ∈ Bζ =⇒ βζ(x, a)σ w]. If x is not a leaf, then let
y = min{βζ(w, b) | (w, b) ∈ (Y (x)×{b})∩Bζ}. Condition (52), together with
the induction hypothesis, specifies that βζ(x, b) = βζ(w, b)σ w σ x. Again,
since b is arbitrary, ∀a [[(x, a) ∈ Bζ =⇒ βζ(x, a)σ x]. Since this condition
holds whether or not x is a leaf, it holds for all x.
To prove the second conjunct of (53) by well founded induction on σ,
consider the induction hypothesis that, for all w ∈ Y (X) and for all a and
y, [(w, a) ∈ Bζ and βζ(w, a)σ y σ w]
=⇒ ζ(y) 6= a. Suppose that (x, b) ∈ Bζ and, for some z, βζ(x, b)σ z σ x.
If x is a leaf, then z = x, so (x, b) ∈ Bζ implies that ζ(z) 6= b. If x is
not a leaf, then let y = min{βζ(w, b) | (w, b) ∈ (Y (x) × {b}) ∩ Bζ}, so that
βζ(x, b) = βζ(y, b), so the first assertion of (53) (proved in the preceding
paragraph) entails that βζ(x, b)σ y Thus, by lemma 3, there is a path from
βζ(x, b) to y, which extends to x since yΣ1 x. Also by lemma 3 (applying
it twice and concatenating paths, if βζ(x, b) and z and x are all distinct),
since βζ(x, b)σ z σ x, there is a path from βζ(x, b) to x that passes through z.
Since the path from βζ(x, b) to x is unique, the two paths just enumerated are
identical. Thus, either βζ(x, z) = βζ(y, b)σ z σ y or else z = x. In the former
case, the induction hypothesis entails that ζ(z) 6= b. In the latter case, since
(x, b) ∈ Bζ , ζ(z) = ζ(x) 6= b. The overall conclusion from these various cases
is that, for all a and y, [(x, a) ∈ Bζ and βζ(x, a)σ y σ x] =⇒ ζ(y) 6= a, so
assertion (53) follows from lemma 5 (that is, by well founded induction). 
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Recall the definition (9), that l(x) = {z | z ∈ Λ and z σ x}. The following
characterization of l follows easily from lemma 6.
Corollary 3. If the e-structure, (X, σ), is a finite tree, then
z ∈ l(x) ⇐⇒ ∃y [y σ x and ∃a z = βζ(y, a)].
The next lemma will be used to construct a SCEU-rational state-contingent
utility functions, in terms of which an ID-consistent plan can be rationalized.
Given a set, S, and an embedding, b, of (X, σ) in (S, 2S) and a surjective
function, β, from some set, B, to S, a new embedding, e, is defined that
maps each e-state to a subset of the graph, Ω, of β. That is, e : X→ 2Ω and
(55) Ω = {(b, s) | b ∈ B and s ∈ S and β(b) = s}
The lemma is proved by verifying routinely that each of the conditions (24)–
(28) in the definition of an embedding is inherited by e from b. The lemma
applies with B = Bζ , S = Λ, b = l, and β = βζ by proposition 1 and the
surjectivity assertion of lemma 6.
Lemma 7. If b embeds (X, σ) in (S, 2S), β maps an arbitrary set, B, sur-
jectively to S, Ω is defined by (55), and e is defined as follows by (56),
(56) e(x) = {(b, s) | β(b) = s ∈ b(x)} = Ω ∩ (B × b(x))
then e embeds (X, σ) in (Ω, 2Ω).
The final prerequisite to proving proposition 2 is to assign natural num-
bers to the elements of X×A in a way that respects Σ as an order relation.
Lemma 8. If (X, σ) is a tree, and if X is countable (but not necessarily
finite) and A is finite, then there is an injective function ν : X×A→ N such
that, for (x, a) ∈ X×A and (y, b) ∈ X×A,
(57) xΣ y =⇒ ν(x, a) > ν(y, b)
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that X ⊆ N and A = {0, . . . ,m}.
Let k0, k1 . . . enumerate without repetition the prime numbers greater than
2m.26 For (x, a) ∈ Bζ , define ν(x, a) = 2
a
∏
{z|xσ z} kz. (Recall that a and z,
which are respectively an alternative and an e-state, are being represented
as natural numbers.)
To prove that ν is injective, note that if (x, a) 6= (y, b), then either a 6= b
or else x 6= y, which is equivalent to not both xσ y and y σ x because σ is
reflexive and antisymmetric. It must be shown that, in either case, ν(x, a) 6=
ν(y, b). Consider first the case that a 6= b. Then there are odd numbers,
i and j, such that ν(x, a) = 2ai and ν(y, b) = 2bj. By the unique-prime-
factorization theorem, 2ai 6= 2bj. That is, ν(x, a) 6= ν(y, b). Next consider
26There are infinitely many such primes, so distinct elements of X can be associated
with distinct primes. Cf. Gallier [2011, theorem 5.6]. Also invoked below is the unique
prime factorization theorem, that each n > 1 has a unique (up to permutation) factoriza-
tion into powers of prime numbers. Cf. Gallier [2011, theorem 5.10].
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the case that x 6= y. Suppose, without loss of generality, that not y σ x.
Then, ky is not a prime factor of ν(x), but it is a prime factor of ν(y).
Again by the unique-prime-factorization theorem ν(x, a) 6= ν(y, b). Since
ν(x, a) 6= ν(y, b) is obtained in both cases, ν is injective.
Suppose now that xΣ y. By lemma 3, d(y) < d(x), and also ν(y, b) =
2b
∏
{z|y σ z} kz and ν(x, a) = 2
a
∏
{z|xσ z} kz = 2
(a−b)
∏
{z|xσ zΣ y} kzν(y, b) ≥
2−bkxν(y, b). Since b ≤ m, 2
b < kx, so ν(y, b) < ν(x, a). 
Now the groundwork has been laid to prove proposition 2, stating that a
finite tree plan is SCEU rational if, and only if, it is ID consistent. For the
remainder of this section, the conditions of lemma 6 are assumed to hold.
That is, (X, σ) is a finite e-structure that is a tree, and ζ : X→ A. Bζ and βζ
are defined by equations (51) and (52) respectively. The convention in the
proof of lemma 8, that X and A are represented as subsets of N, continues
to be observed.
Proof of Proposition 2. First it is proved that, if ζ is ID consistent, then it
is SCEU rational. A sample space, (Ωζ , 2
Ωζ , pi), will be employed, where Ωζ
is essentially the graph of βζ .
27
(58) Ωζ = {(x, a, βζ(x, a)) | (x, a) ∈ Bζ}
The elements of Ωζ will be called sample points.
28
The probability measure, pi, is now defined by specifying its values on
the singleton events in 2Ωζ . Since Ωζ is finite, the probabilities of all larger
events are determined by additivity.
(59)
q(x,a,z) = ν(x, a)
rω = 3
−qω
pi({ω}) =
rω∑
ψ∈Ωζ
rψ
Note that, since there is a 1–1 correspondence between the domain of a
function (βζ , in this case) and its graph, and since ν is an injective function,
ψ 6= ω implies that qψ 6= qω.
State-contingent utility functions, {ua : Ωζ → R}a∈A will now be defined.
(60) ua(w, b, z) =
{
1, if ∃y [z σ y σ w and ζ(y) = a]
0, otherwise
Define eζ : X→ 2
Ωζ by
(61) eζ(x) = (X ×A× l(x)) ∩ Ωζ
By lemma 7, eζ is an embedding.
27An element of Ωζ is of form (x, a, βζ(x, a)), while an element of the graph of βζ is of
form ((x, a), βζ(x, a)).
28Sample points are what Bayesian theorists, following Savage [1972], generally call
states of the world.
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According to condition (34), with integration expressed as summation as
specified in footnote 18, eζ , pi, and {ua : Ωζ → R}a∈A SCEU rationalize ζ iff,
for every (x, a) in Bζ ,
(62)
∑
ω∈eζ(x)
[uζ(x)(ω)− ua(ω)]pi({ω}) > 0
If (y, a, z) ∈ eζ(x) = (X × A× l(x)) ∩ Ωζ , then z σ x by (10), and also z σ y
by (53) and (58). Then, by the definition of a tree, (49),
(63) (y, a, z) ∈ eζ(x) =⇒ [xσ y or y σ x]
The next step is to fix (x, a) ∈ Bζ and to express (62) in terms of a
partition of eζ(x). Let ω = (x, a, βζ(x, a)). By (58) and (61), ω ∈ eζ(x).
Denote the set of sample points, (y, b, z), in eζ(x) that are as shallow as ω
(in the sense that xσ y), excluding ω, by S, and the set of sample points in
eζ(x) that are deeper than x by D. These sets are defined formally by
(64) S = Ωζ ∩{(y, b, z) | z σ xσ y} \ {ω} D = Ωζ ∩ {(y, b, z) | z σ yΣx}
By corollary 3, {{ω}, S,D} is a partition of eζ(x). Therefore (62) can be
written as
[uζ(x)(ω)− ua(ω)]pi(ω) +
∑
ψ∈S
[uζ(x)(ψ)− ua(ψ)]pi({ψ})
+
∑
ψ∈D
[uζ(x)(ψ) − ua(ψ)]pi({ψ}) > 0
(65)
The terms of of (65) corresponding to ω, S, and D are now examined,
beginning with
[uζ(x)(ω)− ua(ω)]pi(ω).
By (53), βζ(x, a)σ x. Therefore uζ(x)(βζ(x, a)) = 1 by (60), the definition
of ua. Also by (53) and that definition, ua(βζ(x, a)) = 0. Therefore
(66) [uζ(x)(ω)− ua(ω)]pi(ω) = pi(ω)
Next, consider
∑
ψ∈S [uζ(x)(ψ)−ua(ψ)]pi({ψ}) and
∑
ψ∈D[uζ(x)(ψ)−ua(ψ)]pi({ψ}).
Suppose that ψ = (y, b, z). Condition (64), defining ψ ∈ S, is that z σ xσ y
and ψ 6= ω, so uζ(x)(ψ) = 1 by (60). Since ua(ψ) ≤ 1,
(67)
∑
ψ∈S
[uζ(x)(ψ)− ua(ψ)]pi({ψ}) > 0
Also, because ua(ψ) ≤ 1 and uζ(x)(ψ) ≥ 0
(68)
∑
ψ∈D
[uζ(x)(ψ) − ua(ψ)]pi({ψ}) ≥ −
∑
ψ∈D
pi({ψ})
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It follows from (66)–(68) that
[uζ(x)(ω)− ua(ω)]pi(ω) +
∑
ψ∈S
[uζ(x)(ψ) − ua(ψ)]pi({ψ})
+
∑
ψ∈D
[uζ(x)(ψ)− ua(ψ)]pi({ψ}) > pi({ω} −
∑
ψ∈D
pi({ψ})
(69)
Thus, condition (62) is a sufficient condition for ID consistency to imply
SCEU rationality, and a sufficient condition for (62) is that
(70)
∑
ψ∈D
pi({ψ}) < pi({ω})
By condition (59), qω = ν(x, a). Also by conditions (57), (59), and (64),
qψ > ν(x, a) for ψ ∈ D. Therefore, by (59), rω ≥ 3
−ν(x,a) and, for ψ ∈ D,
rψ < 3
−ν(x,a). Moreover, as was remarked just after definition (59) of q,
there is a 1–1 correspondence between ψ and qψ. Thus
(71)
∑
ψ∈D
rψ =
∑
ψ∈D
3−qψ ≤
∑
n>ν((x,a)
3−n < 3−ν(x,a) = 3−qω = rω
Since pi({ξ}) is a positive-real multiple of rξ (by a factor that does not
depend on ξ), (71) implies (70), so being ID consistent is sufficient for a
plan to be SCEU rational.
Finally the converse implication, from SCEU rationality of plan ζ to ID
consistency, must be proved. Suppose that e : X → Ω is an embedding
into a probability space, (Ω,B, pi) that, along with state-contingent utility
functions, 〈ua〉a∈A, SCEU rationalizes ζ. Suppose that x /∈ Λ and that, for
all y ∈ Y (x), ζ(y) = a. Let b 6= a. Then, since ζ is SCEU rational, for all
y ∈ Y (x),
∫
e(y) ua − ub dpi > 0. By lemma 4, {e(y) | y ∈ Y (x)} is a partition
of e(x). Therefore,
∫
e(x) ua − ub dpi > 0. From this inequality holding for all
b 6= a, it follows from SCEU rationality that ζ is ID consistent at x. 
5. Countably branching tree plans
5.1. Why study infinite plans? There are some questions that arise
specifically in the context of infinite e-structures and plans. For exam-
ple, question, under what conditions do an agent’s conditional beliefs about
an event converge asymptotically to certainty, can only be studied if the
agent might proceed through an infinite sequence of successively more spe-
cific evidential states. That study requires an e-structure resembling the
one contemplated in section 4.1 with respect to betting on the bias of a coin
that is tossed potentially infinitely many times, that consisted of of all finite
binary sequences. Besides there being applications that require an infinitely
deep evidential structure to model, there are also some applications that
require an infinitely broad one. If, in some e-state, x, a chemist receives
a reading of how many clicks of a Geiger-Mueller counter were registered
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during a one-hour interval in the presence of some sample of slightly ra-
dioactive material. The number of clicks might be any non-negative integer,
so it might be argued that, in principle, Y (x) should be a countable set.29 It
turns out that countably branching e-structures are no more difficult to an-
alyze than finitely-branching ones are, so, in this section, it will be assumed
that
(72) For every x, Y (x) is a countable set.
Obviously there are cases (for instance, in which evidence consists of real-
valued measurements) in which, in principle, Y (x) ought to be uncountable.
That extension of the theory will not be made here, though, because it would
entail a big sacrifice of mathematical tractability.
5.2. Equivalence of SCEU rationality and ID consistency. The fol-
lowing generalization of proposition 2 is to be proved.
Proposition 3. If (X, σ) is both an e-structure and a countably branching
tree, and if ζ : X→ A is ID consistent, then ζ is SCEU rational. Conversely,
under those assumptions, a SCEU-rational tree plan must be ID consistent.
The proof, as well as the statement, of this proposition follows closely
its finite analogue. Before pursuing the details of this proof, let us take
stock of what has to be done in order to dispense with finiteness. The proof
of proposition 2 depends on proposition 1, lemmas 3–8, and corollary 3.
Among these, lemmas 3–5 make no mention of cardinality, and so can be
used in the proof of proposition 3. Lemma 8 requires that X should be
countable, but not necessarily finite. It will be proved, as lemma 9, that a
countably branching tree has countably many nodes, so lemma 8 can also
be used here.
Proofs of the remaining results on which proposition 2 depends, and the
proof of the proposition itself, depend on finiteness in two ways. First, in
the construction of a probability space, (Ωζ ,B, pi), to represent ζ as a SCEU
rational rational plan, Ωζ is taken to be a set that is in 1–1 correspondence
with Λ, and the fact that l embeds (X, σ) in (Λ, 2Λ) (that is, proposition 1)
is used to construct an embedding, e, of (X, σ) in (Ωζ ,B). However, as has
just been pointed out, an infinite tree may have no leaves, so the usefulness
of proposition 1 is restricted to the finite case. To prove proposition 3, a
generally valid embedding must be devised to play the role that lemma 7
plays in the finite case. This will be done in lemma 10. Second, lemma
5 is proved by well founded recursion and induction on σ, and there are
29Of course, an argument about this point has two sides. Offsetting the desirability
of adopting a specification that imposes no ad hoc bound, is the consideration that any
physical measuring apparatus will have a finite upper bound on how many distinct events
can be counted during an hour.
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some infinite trees for which σ is not well founded.30 Specifically, βζ is
defined recursively on σ in the proof of lemma 5, and a substitute for that
construction must be found. That will be done in lemma 11, where recursion
on the natural numbers will be used to construct a different function (also
to be called βζ) with domain Bζ , and then to have the range of βζ play the
role that Λ plays in the finite case.
Lemma 9. If (X, σ) is a countably branching tree, then X is countable.
Proof. Let (X, σ) be a countably branching tree. By the definition of a tree,
each element of X has a finite depth. Define Xn = {x | x ∈ X and the depth
of x is n}. By induction, each Xn is is countable. The basis case is that
X0 = {r}. Suppose that Xn is countable. Then Xn+1 =
⋃
z∈Xn
Y (z) The
right side of this equation is a countable union of countable sets, which
is countable, so Xn+1 is countable. Therefore, by induction, every Xn is
countable. Finally, X =
⋃
n∈N Xn is a countable union of countable sets, so
it is countable. 
Lemma 10. Suppose that (X, σ) is an e-structure and S is an arbitrary set,
and that B ⊆ X×A and β : B → S satisfy the following conditions.
(73) β : B → S is surjective, and ∀x ∃a (x, a) ∈ B
(74)
∀x ∀a [[(x, a) ∈ B and ∃y yΣx] =⇒
∃z [zΣx and (z, a) ∈ B and β(z, a) = β(x, a)]]
(75) ∀x ∀y [x ⊥ y =⇒ β(B ∩ ({x} ×A)) ∩ β(B ∩ ({y} ×A)) = ∅]
Define b : X→ 2S by
(76) b(z) = β(B ∩ ({w | w σ z} ×A))
Then b is an embedding of (X, σ) into (S, 2S).
Proof. It must be proved that b satisfies conditions (24)–(28) of the defini-
tion of an embedding. By (76), b(r) = β(B ∩ ({w | wσ r} ×A)) = β(B), so
b(r) = S because, by (73), β is surjective. That is, (24) holds.
Condition (25), that b(x) 6= ∅, holds by definition (76) and because, by
(73), B ∩ ({x} ×A) is not empty.
By (76),
⋃
zΣ x b(z) ⊆ b(x). To verify (26), it remains to show that
b(x) ⊆
⋃
zΣx b(z) if ∃y yΣx. Suppose that ∃y yΣx and s ∈ b(x). By (74),
there are some y σ x and a ∈ A such that (y, a) ∈ B and β(y, a) = s. If
yΣx, then s ∈
⋃
wΣ x b(w). Otherwise, y = x. By (74), there is some z Σx
such that (z, a) ∈ B and β(z, a) = s. Again, s ∈
⋃
wΣ x b(w).
Condition (27) follows directly from definition (76) of b.
To prove (28), first suppose that x ⊥ y. Let wσ x and z σ y. Then w ⊥ z.
By (75), β(B ∩ ({w} × A)) ∩ β(B ∩ ({z} × A)) = ∅]. Therefore, since this
30For example, the e-structure in the coin-tossing example of section 4.1 is not well
founded.
EVIDENCE-BASED CHOICE 27
conclusion holds for all w and z that are weakly more specific than x and
y respectively, b(x) ∩ b(y) = ∅. Conversely, suppose that b(x) ∩ b(y) = ∅.
Then there do not exist z and a such that z σ x and z σ y and (z, a) ∈ B, or
else β(z, a) ∈ b(x) ∩ b(y). But if not x ⊥ y, then there is some z such that
z σ x and z σ y, in which case also (73) would guarantee that (z, a) ∈ B for
some a. Thus it is proved by contradiction that x ⊥ y, completing the proof
of (28). 
Now an analogue of lemma 6 for tree plans, which need not be finite, is
stated and proved.
Lemma 11. Suppose that (X, σ) is an e-structure that is a tree, and that
ζ : X→ A is ID consistent. By lemma 9, it may be assumed without loss of
generality that X ⊆ N. Define Bζ by (51). Then there is a unique function,
βζ : Bζ → X
N such that, for all (x, a) ∈ Bζ , βζ(x, a) is the function f , that
is defined according to (77). Let 〈z0, . . . , zn〉 be the path from r to x (that is,
satisfy (50) with z0 = r and zn = x).
(77) f(k) =


zk if k ≤ n
min{y | y ∈ Y (f(k − 1)) and ζ(y) 6= a} if k > n and
Y (f(k − 1)) 6= ∅
f(k − 1) otherwise
Conditions (74) and (75) are satisfied with B = Bζ and β = βζ . Also, for
all (y, b) ∈ Bζ,
(78) βζ(y, b) = f =⇒ ∃m [ f(m) = y and ∀k≥m ζ(f(k)) 6= b ]
Proof. First it should be clarified how (77) uniquely defines the function
f = βζ(x, a), where 〈z0, . . . , zn〉 be the path from r to x. For k < n, the
first clause of (77) is an explicit definition. For k > n, (77) is equivalent to
the following definition by recursion on N, having i as the variable on which
recursion is performed.
(79)
f(n+ 0) = zn
f(n+ i+ 1) =


min {y | y ∈ Y (f(n+ i))
and ζ(y) 6= a} if Y (f(n+ i)) 6= ∅
f(n+ i) otherwise
To verify that condition (74) holds, suppose that, for some x and a, that
n is the depth of x and (x, a) ∈ Bζ and βζ(x, a) = f and the antecedent of
(74) is satisfied at (x, a). That is, suppose that, for some y, yΣx. Since
(X, σ) is a tree, {w | y σ wΣx} is finite, so it is well ordered by σ−1, and
therefore has a least specific element. That is, Y (x) 6= ∅. Since ζ is ID
consistent and (x, a) ∈ Bζ , there is some z ∈ Y (x) such that ζ(z) 6= a. Thus
f(n+ 1) is defined by the first alternative of (79), that f(n+ 1) = min{y |
y ∈ Y (f(n + i)) and ζ(y) 6= a}. Assume without loss of generality that
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z = min{y | y ∈ Y (f(n + i)) and ζ(y) 6= a}, so that f(n + 1) = z. Then
(z, a) ∈ Bζ . Let βζ(z, a) = g. Then f(k) = g(k) for k ≤ n, and, by induction
on N using (79), ∀i ∈ N f(n + i) = g(n + i). That is, βζ(x, a) = βζ(z, a),
establishing that the consequent of (44) holds for x and a.
To verify that condition (75) holds, suppose that (x, a) ∈ Bζ and (y, b) ∈
Bζ and, without loss of generality, that the depths of x and y are i and j
respectively and that i ≤ j. Suppose also the negation of the consequent of
(75) so that, for some f , f ∈ β(B ∩ ({x}×A))∩ β(B ∩ ({y}×A)). By (77),
f(i) = x and f(j) = y. By induction on n −m, if m ≤ n and βζ(x, a) = f ,
then f(n)σ f(m). Therefore y σ x, so not x ⊥ y. Condition (75) holds by
contraposition.
Condition (78) follows immediately from (77) by using induction on k to
prove βζ(y, b) = f =⇒ [f(m) = y and ∀k≥m ζ(f(k)) 6= b], taking m to be
the depth of y. 
Corollary 4. Define Bζ by (51) and define βζ : Bζ → X
N by setting βζ(x, a) =
f , where f satisfies (77). Define S = βζ(Bζ). Define Ωζ, the graph of βζ ,
by (58). Define bζ : X → 2
S by (76), with β = βζ and B = Ωζ. Define
eζ : X→ 2
Ωζ by
(80) eζ(x) = {(z, a, f) | (z, a, f) ∈ Ωζ and ∃n f(n) = x}
Then eζ is an embedding of (X, σ) in (Ωζ , 2
Ωζ ).
Proof. As B and S are defined in the corollary, condition (73) is clearly sat-
isfied. By lemma 11, conditions (74) and (75) are also satisfied. Therefore,
by lemma 10, bζ is an embedding. Finally, by lemma 7 and (80), eζ is also
an embedding. 
With the foregoing preparation, the proof of proposition 3 can now be
completed.
Proof of Proposition 3. As in corollary 4, define Bζ by (51), βζ by setting
βζ(x, a) = f where f satisfies (51), S = βζ(Bζ), Ωζ by (58), bζ by (76) with
β = βζ and B = Ωζ , and eζ by (80).
Define state-contingent utility functions, {ua : Ωζ → R}a∈A, by
(81) ua(x, b, f) =
{
1, if ∃i ∃j [i ≤ j and f(i) = x and and ζ(f(j)) = a]
0, otherwise
Define subsets S and D of Ωζ by
(82)
(y, b, f) ∈ S ⇐⇒ [(y, b, f) 6= ω and
∃i ∃j [i ≤ j and y = f(i) and x = f(j)]]
and
(83)
(y, b, f) ∈ D ⇐⇒ [y 6= x and
∃i ∃j [i < j and x = f(i) and y = f(j)]]
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From this point forward, proposition 3 is proved by repeating word-for-
word the proof of proposition 2, except for the handful of amendments that
will be specified below. The overall principle underlying these amendments
is that, wherever the proof of proposition 2 envisions that the range of βζ
is Λ, the proof of proposition 3 envisions rather that the range of βζ is a
subset of XN. In particular, where a statement that z σ w (where z = βζ(y, b)
is a leaf) appears in the proof of proposition 2, that statement should be
replaced in the proof of proposition 3 by a statement that ∃i f(i) = w,
where f = βζ(y, b).
• The assertion that Ωζ is finite, in the sentence immediately preceding
the equations (59), should be replaced by an assertion (justified by
lemma 9) that Ωζ is countable.
31 Since every function of a countable
domain is measurable with respect to the power set of the domain,
the utility functions ua defined in (81) are measurable functions.
• Definitions (60) and (61) are replaced by definitions (81) and (80)
respectively. Definition (64) is replaced by definitions (82) and (83).
Subsequent references to (60), (61), and (64) must also be revised.
• A reference to condition (53), at the beginning of the paragraph
where condition (66) is stated, should be replaced by a reference
to condition (78). Following the reference to (53) is a paraphrase,
‘βζ(x, a)σ x’, of a clause of the condition. That paraphrase should
be amended to ‘∃i f(i) = x, where f = βζ(x, a)’.
• At the beginning of the paragraph where inequality (67) is stated,
‘ψ = (y, b, z)’ should be amended to ‘ψ = (y, b, f)’. In a paraphrase
of (64) in the sentence immediately preceding the statement of con-
dition (67), the clause stating that ‘z σ xσ y’, should be amended to
‘∃i ∃j [i ≤ j and y = f(i) and x = f(j)]’.

6. Concluding remarks
6.1. Antecedent theories of subjective conditional probability. While
Savage does not formalize the notion of an agent making a choice after having
received evidence, he regards his theory as “giv[ing] an atemporal analysis
of [a] temporally described decision situation: the person must decide be-
tween [two alternatives] after he . . . observes, whether [an event] obtains[.]”
[1972, p. 23] Savage remarks in [Aumann and Savage, 1990] that his discus-
sion of small worlds in [1972, section 5.5] reflects his awareness of difficulties
implicit in that interpretation, particularly regarding the specification that
consequences have utilities that are independent of the state of the world.
Dre`ze [1961] and Aumann, in [Aumann and Savage, 1990], fully articulated
those difficulties, and noted that the uniqueness of probabilities and (up
to a positive affine transformation) utilities derived by Savage would not
31Since X is countable and A is finite, Bζ is countable; and since there is a 1–1 corre-
spondence between Bζ and Ωζ , Ωζ is countable.
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survive deleting the state-independent-utility assumption. Slightly prior to
Aumann’s critique, several researchers had provided models of, and repre-
sentation theorems for, explicit conditioning of subjective expected utility
on events. (Krantz et al. [1971] exposit their own and other researchers’
contributions.) These models, and also a closely related model due to Ski-
adas [1997], take acts and states of the world to be primitive, and treat the
consequence of taking an act in a state of the world to be simply the ordered
pair of the act and the state; while an alternate model due to Karni [2015]
takes acts and consequences to be primitive, and constructs states of the
world as functions from acts to consequences. In all cases, and also in the
models of dynamic consistency and consequentialism mentioned in footnote
4, evidential states are identified with events, which are modeled as sets of
states of the world, and those sets are assumed to form a Boolean algebra.
6.2. Finitely versus countably additive probabilities. As Schervish
et al. [1984] document, Bayesians have been divided on whether finitely
or countably additive probability measures provide the more conceptually
appropriate representation of subjective probabilities. While SCEU ratio-
nality has been defined here in terms of countably additive probabilities, all
of the results established in this article are robust to changing to a defini-
tion in terms of finitely additive probabilities. The choice between the two
frameworks has three implications. First, finitely additive measures can be
defined on all subsets of a set, while, for uncountable sets, the domain of a
countably additive measure must generally be a strict subset of the power
set of that set. All of the examples formulated in this article, as well as
the constructions utilized in the proofs of proposition 2 and proposition 3,
involve measures that are defined on the full power set of a countable set,
so that distinction is moot. Second, integration with respect to a countably
additive measure is well defined for a class of unbounded functions, while
integration with respect to a finitely additive measure is defined for bounded
functions only. Again, boundedness of utility functions has been imposed in
the definition of SCEU rationality for reasons independent of finite additiv-
ity, the distinction is moot. Third, even in cases where a countably additive
measure can be defined on the full power set of an infinite set, there are
finitely additive measures that are not countably additive. Since the ex-
amples and propositions of this article concern the existence of probability
measures rather than the properties shared by all probability measures, and
since countably additive measures have been constructed or proved to exist
and those measures are a fortiori finitely additive, the distinction is moot
once again.
6.3. The parsimonious theory is weak. One way of thinking about the
strength of theories is that a theory is strong if it has few models, and es-
pecially if all its models resemble the intended model in salient respects. In
section 4.1, an evidential structure was introduced to represent the infinitely-
repeated tossing of a coin, and the intended interpretation of that structure
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was described. Specifically, the e-structure is intended to describe an un-
countable probability space with a non-atomic probability measure. It is
obvious how to specify a plan to represent the choices of a risk-neutral agent
who has an opportunity to bet on whether or not the coin is biased towards
‘heads’ (that is, on whether or not the long-run average of the fraction of
tosses that land ‘heads’ will exceed 1/2): bet on heads in an evidential state
(that is, after having observed a finite number of tosses) if, and only if, more
than half of the tosses have landed ‘heads’. There is an intuitive class of
intended models that show this plan to be SCEU rational. That is, two
coins, of bias (1 + x)/2 and (1 − x)/2 (for 0 < x < 1) are placed in an
urn, and then one of them is drawn at random (with probability 1/2, ac-
cording to the agent’s beliefs) and is tossed repeatedly. Like the intended
model of a sequence of tosses of a known coin, the models in this class in-
volve non-atomic measures on uncountable sets. However, by proposition
3, the plan is also rationalized by a model involving a purely atomic prob-
ability measure on a countable set. This phenomenon, that a theory with
an uncountable intended model also has an countable model, is reminiscent
of the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem [Bell and Slomson, 2006, theorem 3.5]
regarding first-order theories. The present theory of SCEU rationality is a
second-order theory, since the definition of SCEU rationality has the form,
“There exist functions, ua, such that. . . ”. Nonetheless, it is a weak the-
ory in precisely the respect that the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem is typically
understood to exhibit the weakness of first-order theories.
6.4. Embedding an infinite e-structure in a Boolean algebra. Corol-
lary 4 is an analogue of proposition 1 for countable e-structures that are
trees. In fact, every e-structure, even an uncountable e-structure that are
not a tree, can be embedded in a Boolean algebra. This fact follows from
theorems 7.11 (Stone’s representation theorem) and theorem 14.10 of Jech
[2002], and was used by Borhani and Green [2016] to prove proposition 3.
It might be useful for generalizing the present theory.
6.5. SCEU rationality corresponds to na¨ıve Bayesian rationality.
In the Bayesian subjectivist theory of inference (sketched by Savage in [1972,
chaptes 6,7]), an evidential state corresponds to an observation. The agent
observes one thing or another, so distinct evidential states are reached in
disjoint events. Therefore (assuming that something or other will be ob-
served), the evidential states correspond to a partition of the states of the
world. Thus their probabilities sum to one and, in particular, the sum of
probabilities of several evidential states cannot exceed one. In the theory de-
veloped in the present article, the event associated with an evidential state,
x, is e(x). In general, the events associated with distinct evidential states
are not disjoint. Consequently the sum of their probabilities can exceed one.
This possibility plays a role in the proof of claim 1, for example, where it is
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specified that pi(e(x1)) = pi(e(x2)) = 5/7. That is, the subjective probabili-
ties ascribed to the SCEU-rational agent in the example violate a constraint
that a Bayesian analysis would impose on the agent’s beliefs.
The questions then arise, under what conditions on an evidential struc-
ture do the probabilities ascribed to the agent by every embedding of the
e-structure into a probability space necessarily satisfy the Bayesian con-
straints, and under what conditions does there at least exist some embed-
ding for which the ascribed probabilities satisfy the Bayesian constraints.
Borhani and Green [2018] study these questions. They find that only trivial
e-structures, in which every e-state in X \ {r} is immediately more specific
than r, necessarily induce probabilities that reflect an underlying Bayesian
model. They also find that, for a class of e-structures that strictly includes
trees, some embedding into a probability space induces probabilities that
reflect an underlying Bayesian model. Those findings provide an argument
from a Bayesian perspective, complementary to the present results, for the
suggestion, offered at the end of section 1, that the version of SCEU ra-
tionality formulated in this article might better be regarded as a heuristic
criterion than as an intrinsic definition of rational evidence-based choice.
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